Internal
Capitol Police review found sweeping intelligence, security failures on
Pelosi's watch
Secret
after-action report cited widespread ineptitude and inadequate riot squads,
found closing of open-source intelligence unit may have contributed to tragedy.
Capitol Police
compiled a secret after-action review months after the Jan. 6 riots that identified
sweeping blunders by the department ranging from delayed deployment of
specialized civil disturbance units to the fateful dismantling of an
intelligence unit that monitored social media for threats.
Identifying 53 areas
of failure needing corrective action, the June 4, 2021 report, obtained by Just
the News, produces a far more stark portrait of leadership failures than those
offered by Democrat-led investigations, making abundantly clear that the
Capitol Police under House Speaker Nancy Pelosi were ill-equipped to defend one
of America's most symbolic and high-value institutions two decades after the
Sept. 11 attacks.
Specifically, the
report stated that some Capitol Police leaders had received intelligence from
outside sources like the FBI warning of the strong potential for violence,
including the targeting of lawmakers, on the day Congress certified the 2020
election, but those warnings were not properly distilled into the operational
plan given to front-line commanders or highlighted in the summary section known
as the "Bottom Line Up Front."
"The assessment
for 1/6 contained a BLUF that did not express the severity of the threat or the
fact that USCP actually had knowledge of a plan in place," according to
the report. "The statement that protesters may be armed was included, but
it was never expressed with the urgency that they planned to overtake the
Capitol and target Members of Congress."
Instead of clear
warnings to its forces, Capitol Police leaders put "a generic,
all-encompassing quote" in the operational plan that was too vague to
convey the true threat level, the report said.
That intelligence
failure was exacerbated, the review concluded, when new department leadership
installed after Pelosi became Speaker decided to dismantle the department's
open-source intelligence unit that scanned for threats on social media.
The lost window into
the overt discussion of violence on social media prior to Jan. 6 may have
contributed to the tragedy by further blinding commanders and officers to
the potential for serious violence, the report.
"Individuals with
the most experience extrapolating open-source material were not tasked with
reviewing social media to glean intel related to the event," the report
stated.
"The social media
unit was immediately and essentially dismantled under the new leadership,” it
added. "New office reassignments and steering away from the concepts of
having subject matter experts may have contributed to the tragedy."
Senate committee,
House committee and Capitol Police inspector general reports that were released
last year during political hearings and guided by the testimony of the
department's leadership faulted the department in some areas, including
intelligence and preparations.
But the internal after-action
report was constructed from observations from 44 different submissions from
frontline Capitol Police commanders and officers to its Coordination Unit,
providing a specificity of failings and an unvarnished assessment of the senior
leadership and its grasp on command and control during the crisis on Jan. 6.
Rep.
Rodney Davis, R-Ill, the ranking member of the House Administration Committee,
told Just the News on Tuesday night the report raises grave concerns that
Democrats who control Congress seem disinterested to pursue.
“The
recently revealed After-Action report confirms what I’ve been saying for years,
that Speaker Pelosi and Congressional Democrats are not focused on the serious
security failures that occurred under their watch," Davis said.
"Not only did the United States Capitol Police admit that their open
source intelligence capabilities were essentially dismantled under a change in
leadership within the Intelligence Division prior to 1/6, but the report
clearly shows they had knowledge of the potential for violence yet failed
to take the necessary steps to protect the Capitol.
"The
Democratic Majority’s incompetence and unwillingness to fix long-standing
issues was a main contributor to the security failure on January 6th. There
must be immediate accountability and reform," he said.
Just the News reached
out to the Capitol Police public affairs office, which did not immediately
respond to a request for comment on the after-action report.
As Speaker, Pelosi
serves as the mayor of the U.S. Capitol, overseeing the sergeant at arms. As Democrats
try to make a case that former President Donald Trump tried to foment the
violence that occurred on Jan. 6, they have been unable to address the biggest
contradiction: Trump authorized the Pentagon on Jan. 4, 2021 to send up to
20,000 National Guard troops to prevent any violence, and Congress turned
down the request. Former Police Chief Steve Sund, who resigned in the
aftermath, said he repeatedly requested such troops and was turned down by
leadership.
The internal Capitol
Police report doesn't address that issue but makes sweeping assessments about
other failures. It was not, however, provided to many of those who requested to
see it, including Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wisc.).
"Although the
Capitol Police did provide responses to my oversight requests, they did not
continue to provide additional information as they developed it, denying the
American public a fuller accounting of what happened on January 6, 2021,"
Johnson told Just the News on Tuesday night. "The big question that
remains unanswered - and I doubt the House’s partisan special committee will
even be asking it - is “What role did Speaker Pelosi play and to what extent is
she responsible for the lack of Capitol security preparation?”
The internal report
notably validates the claims of some Capitol Police whistleblowers who have
approached Congress or whistleblower groups in recent months suggesting Capitol
Police leadership had not given lawmakers a full assessment of the department's
failures on one of the most violent days in the history of the Capitol,
according to a senior law enforcement official directly familiar with the
report's creation.
"It provides a
very important, and very different perspective from the personnel actually
asked to do the job of protecting the Capitol, lawmakers and legislative staff
in a moment of crisis," the official said, speaking only on condition of
anonymity. "Its findings aren't filtered by leaders or politicians and
come directly from the frontlines. They make clear the Capitol was not
protected in a proactive way."
Asked whether the
Capitol could have been spared the worst violence and damage had many of the 53
documented failures been prevented, the official answered: "Likely so, but
we will never no because no one wants to ask those hard questions."
Former NYPD
Commissioner Bernard Kerik reviewed the report at Just the News' request and
said Tuesday night it pointed to failure at the highest level of Capitol
security.
The report details
"a lack of leadership," he told the "Just the News, Not Noise"
TV show. "It's a lack of preparedness. This is an event on this day that
they were looking at for a week or two prior. You mean to tell me that nobody,
nobody made any preemptive plans on how they were going to deal with any
protests, any crowd, any large gathering around the Capitol for their quick
reaction force ... That's crazy."
Kerik, who helped
former President Donald Trump investigate 2020 election irregularities and was
recently interview by the House Jan. 6 committee, said lawmakers showed no
interest in investigating the security failures he saw that day. He said the
real lessons to be learned won't be complete until Congress has new leadership,
possibly after the November elections.
"You know,
somebody's got to look at this, and it's gonna be up to the next
administration," he said. "The next House is going to have to do
that."
The report's emergence
comes just days before House Democrats launch nationally televised prime-time
hearings on the Jan. 6 tragedy they admit are designed to blame Trump and his
advisers for creating an environment conducive to violence.
But the after-action
report found there was sweeping blame to be shared by the Capitol Police
leadership, citing failures as large as poor communications, staffing, equipment
and preparations and as small as doors to Senate areas that did not lock
properly and elevators leading to a sensitive floor of the complex that did not
get secured during the mayhem.
One of the starkest
findings was the failure of Capitol Police executives to deploy their
specialized Civil Disturbance Units quickly and effectively.
"CDU squads did
not respond in a timely manner," the report concluded. "When the riot
broke out, a CDU hard platoon stood by the Senate air shaft for several minutes
as officers were on the Lower West Terrace fighting."
A variety of reasons
was cited for the slow and uneven deployment of the CDU units, including:
- Equipment was "stored in
locations that were difficult to access which led to slower response
times," including on a bus that officers did not have the key to
unlock.
- Equipment was poorly designed
and did not allow effective radio communications by CDU officers,
requiring some to remove gas masks to communicate.
- Unit training had been focused
on operating in an "urban environment" with "defined
barriers" and not on an "open campus" like the sprawling
Capitol complex. "Commanders should work on better tactics for the
open environment of the Capitol Grounds as opposed to narrow streets in
the middle of a major city," the report recommended.
- Leaders did not have adequate
planning for an event of such severity. "There were not enough hard
platoons deployed for the day," it noted.
- CDU officers had been taken off
their regular duty to cover other assignments, leaving an inadequate
number to respond to the riot.
- The department did not have
adequate numbers of CDU officers training in non-lethal tactics and did
not have enough ammunition for such non-lethal encounters.
"The USCP has
less than 15 lethal trained officers on the CDU," the report said.
"The less than lethal officers tried to hold back the crowd with their
ammunitions, but that proved to be ineffective as there was only one small team
deployed to dispense less than lethal. The rioters wore goggles, masks, and
other makeshift face protection. There was not enough less than lethal
equipment deployed and on several occasions’ officers had to retrieve
additional ammunition."
Remarkably, five
months after the Capitol riot the CDU leadership had not revised its strategy
and plans to address a future event as severe. "Since this event, no CDU
officers from other shifts have received plans for future similar events,"
according to the report. "The Department has continued to staff the same
8-12 hour day shifts without further discussion or training."
The report found that
even the basics of physical security — like secure elevators and locked doors —
were failures in a Capitol building long feared to be a target of terrorists
and violent political extremists.
"Building
physical security did not perform as anticipated during the incident," the
report noted. "Doors in the chambers did not secure properly. Doors within
the Capitol were easily kicked in. Windows were broken by rioters on the first
floor to gain access."
Similarly, sensitive
offices on the 4th floor of the Capitol were left accessible.
"Unauthorized personnel were utilizing the elevator to gain access to the
fourth floor in the US Capitol," the report said.
You can read the full
report here:
USCP-Jan6AfterActionReportandRecommendations6-4-21.pdf
